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Abstract
This article investigates how a rms nancial strength a¤ects its dynamic decision to
invest in R&D. We estimate a dynamic model of R&D choice using data for German rms in
high-tech manufacturing industries. The model incorporates a measure of the rms nancial
strength, derived from its credit rating, which is shown to lead to substantial di¤erences in
estimates of the costs and expected long-run benets from R&D investment. Financially
strong rms have a higher probability of generating innovations from their R&D investment,
and the innovations have a larger impact on productivity and prots. Averaging across all
rms, the long run benet of investing in R&D equals 6.6 percent of rm value. It ranges
from 11.6 percent for rms in a strong nancial position to 2.3 percent for rms in a weaker
nancial position.
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1 Introduction
The paper by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) (hereafter, CDM) provides an organizing
framework linking rm data on research, innovation, and productivity. In the past 15 years
it has become the basis for a large empirical literature analyzing the relationship between
R&D investment, innovation outcomes such as new product introductions and patents, and
productivity. The empirical studies built on this framework have established that rm R&D
investment increases innovation outputs and these in turn are positively correlated with rm
productivity. Firm productivity growth is not an exogenous nor purely random process but is
rather systematically a¤ected by the rms R&D investment decision.
The process of a rms endogenous investment in R&D is characterized by costs that are
largely sunk, up-front expenditures and a payo¤ that is both uncertain and delayed in time.
A recent paper by Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2013) (hereafter, PRVF) develops a
dynamic, structural model of the rms R&D investment decision that explicitly incorporates
these characteristics and also the research-innovation-productivity linkage identied in the CDM
literature.1 In PRVF, the rms demand for R&D depends on its current cost and the expected
payo¤ to the investment, where the latter depends on how R&D a¤ects innovation outcomes,
how these outcomes a¤ect the rms future productivity and prots, and how long-lived these
e¤ects are. Their analysis provides estimates of the expected benets of R&D, that are dened
as the increment to long-run rm value resulting from the R&D investment.
The PRVF model assumes that rms will choose to invest in R&D whenever the expected
discounted stream of benets is greater than the incurred cost. One further factor that can
play a crucial role in the rms investment decision is its nancial resources. This a¤ects the
ability to nance the R&D outlays and to successfully develop and market the innovations.
Financing of R&D can be done with a combination of current cash ow, retained past earnings,
and borrowing. Firms that are in poor nancial condition are not likely to have access to
these resources and may thus be constrained in their R&D decision. In this article we extend
the PRVF model to recognize that rms di¤er in their ability to nance R&D investment.
We construct a summary measure of a rms nancial strength, based on their credit rating,
1Roberts and Vuong (2013) provide a nontechnical overview of the PRVF framework.
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reecting their ability to fund R&D investments. This measure depends on, among other
things, information on the rms sales, capital stocks, order history, growth, and history of bill
payments.
The model is estimated using rm-level data for ve high-tech industries in the German
manufacturing sector. The results indicate signicant di¤erences in both the cost and the long-
run expected benets of R&D across rms with di¤erent levels of nancial strength. Firms in
the highest nancial strength category have the largest productivity improvements following
an innovation. A rm in the highest nancial strength category that reports a new product
innovation has a productivity increase of 8.6 percent on average, while a new process innovation
leads to a 9.0 percent increase, and both types of innovations lead to an increase of 11.5 percent.
In contrast, rms in the lowest credit-rating category have productivity increases of 0.8, 0.6,
and 3.8 percent, respectively. Firms with higher credit ratings also have a higher probability of
realizing a product or process innovation. Both of these factors lead to higher expected benets
from R&D investment for rms with better credit ratings. Expecting a high level of benets,
rms will be willing to spend more on R&D. In fact, our estimates show the highest level of
investment benets and R&D expenditures for rms in the highest nancial strength category.
On average, R&D investment is estimated to increase the long-run value of the rm by 6.6
percent. More importantly, this gain in long-run value varies across industries and with rm
nancial strength. Across industries, the average gain varies from 5.5 percent in the electronics
industry to 8.0 percent in chemicals. Across nancial strength categories, it varies from 11.6
percent for rms in the highest category to 2.3 for rms in the lowest category.
The next section incorporates the role of nancial strength into the PRVF model of dynamic
R&D choice. The third section summarizes the data sample, which is drawn from the Mannheim
Innovation Panel. The fourth and fth sections present the empirical model and discuss the
results.
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2 A Model of R&D Investment and Financial Strength
Following Griliches (1979), a large empirical literature has estimated the impact of R&D on
rm productivity, output, or prots using the knowledge production function framework. R&D
creates a stock of knowledge or expertise within the rm that enters into the rms production
function as an additional input along with physical capital, labor, and materials. This frame-
work was extended in several ways by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998). In their analysis
they distinguished between the inputs and outputs of the innovation process, included measures
of innovation outputs such as patents and the share of rm sales devoted to new products in
the empirical model, and utilized econometric methods that recognized the endogeneity of the
R&D choice. Their basic setup incorporated three equations characterizing the stages of the
innovation process: (i) R&D equation describing the determinants of research inputs, (ii) inno-
vation function linking research inputs and innovation outputs, and (iii) productivity equation
linking innovations to productivity. This framework has been the basis for many empirical
studies quantifying the impact of R&D on rm performance.2
One limitation of the existing CDM literature is that the equation describing the rms
choice of R&D in stage 1 has not been specied in a way that takes advantage of all the deter-
minants of the rms R&D choice. The dynamic model developed by PRVF takes advantage of
the CDM structure to specify the rms R&D investment decision as the solution to a dynamic
optimization problem in which the rm weighs the costs incurred against the expected long-run
benet resulting from the investment. In their model, a rms investment in R&D alters its
probability of realizing product or process innovations. The realized innovations shift the dis-
tribution of rms future productivity and prots. Productivity is allowed to be persistent over
time, so that improvements in one period can lead to a stream of higher future prots. In this
dynamic framework, the benet of R&D investment is its impact on the rms discounted sum
of expected future prots. This impact depends on how R&D a¤ects productivity and output
in the subsequent period, which is the focus of the knowledge production function literature,
but also on how the change in productivity impacts the discounted sum of future rm prots,
2See Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010), Hall and Mohnen (2013), and Mairesse, Verspagen, and Notten
(forthcoming) for recent reviews of the literature.
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including its e¤ect on the rms incentives to invest in R&D in the future.
A large empirical literature has quantied the role of nancial resources in the funding of
R&D. Studies have found that the rms ability to generate funds internally is particularly
important for nancing innovation projects and they have corroborated a positive correlation
between R&D investment and changes in cash ow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988,
Leland and Pyle 1977, Hall 1992, Bhagat and Welch 1995, Himmelberg and Petersen 1994,
Bond, Harho¤ and Van Reenen 2005, and Bougheas, Görg and Strobl 2003).3 In addition,
rms may be reluctant to use other forms of nancing including issuing equity (Carpenter and
Peterson 2002) or using debt (Hall 2002). Even when rms access credit markets, the fact that
much of R&D investment is sunk and cannot be liquidated makes the investment a poor asset
to use as security for the loans and increases the cost of external capital (Alderson and Betker
1996). The higher cost for external capital is likely to have a larger e¤ct on the R&D decision of
rms with low nancial endowment. In the remainder of this section we introduce an indicator
of the rms overall nancial strength into the PRVF model to account for the heterogeneity in
nancing ability and investigate how this a¤ects the rms incentives to invest in R&D.
2.1 Productivity and the Firms Short-Run Prots
We begin with a denition of productivity and its link to a rms short-run prots. Following
PRVF, we specify (i) a log linear short-run marginal cost function, which depends on variable
input prices, capital stock, and a rm-specic cost shock, and (ii) a CES demand function
in which the log of rm output is a function of an aggregate industry time e¤ect, the log of
the rms output price, and a rm-specic demand shifter. Assuming the rm operates in a
monopolistically competitive market, the rms revenue function is derived as:
rit = (1 + )ln (

1 + 
) + ln t + (1 + ) (0 + kkit   !it) + it (1)
The log of the rm revenue in period t is rit; the elasticity of demand is ; which is negative
and assumed to be constant for all rms in the industry, t is a time e¤ect that captures all
market-level variables that are constant across rms including the level of aggregate demand
3A positive relationship between cash ow and R&D investment may simply result because both variables
reect common confounding factors, such as growing market demand, and the correlation is not su¢ cient to
indicate nancial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales 1997).
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for the product and variable input prices, kit is the log of the rms capital stock, !it is rm
productivity, and it is a transitory shock. The rm is assumed to know its revenue productivity
!it which is unobserved to the researcher. Given the form of the rms optimal pricing rule,
which implies a constant markup over marginal cost, there is a simple relationship between the
rms short-run prots and revenue:
it = (!it) =  1

exp(rit): (2)
2.2 R&D Investment and Endogenous Productivity
In this article we treat R&D investment as a discrete variable rdit equal to one if the rm
spends money on innovation activities such as R&D and zero otherwise. The outcomes of the
innovation process are discrete variables zit+1 and dit+1 equal to 1 if the rm realizes a process
or product innovation, respectively, in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. The variable fit is a measure
of the rms nancial strength. We view a rm conducting R&D as investing in a portfolio of
innovation projects. Firms with a high degree of nancial strength are able to invest in more
projects than rms with limited nancial resources. How intensively rms choose to invest
depends on how their nancial strength a¤ects the expected payo¤ from R&D. The next two
components of the model specify this nancial strength-expected payo¤ relationship.
PRVF model the innovation process by allowing the rms R&D participation to alter the
joint probabilities of receiving product and process innovations. The probability the rm real-
izes an innovation is likely to be increasing in the number of R&D projects or, more generally,
the size of the rms R&D portfolio. Firms with higher nancial strength have the ability to
undertake more projects, hence we expect the probability of innovation to be increasing in the
rms nancial strength. We represent this innovation process by a cumulative joint distrib-
ution of innovation types conditional on the rms R&D choices and their nancial strength
F (dit+1; zit+1jrdit; fit). This component of the model corresponds to the second equation in the
CDM framework. Our specication of the innovation production process recognizes that rms
may direct their R&D activity toward improving their production processes and/or developing
new or improved products and that the innovation outcomes are a¤ected by stochastic forces.
Furthermore, it includes the rms nancial strength as a proxy for the size of their R&D project
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portfolio.
The next component of the model is the innovation-productivity linkage, which corresponds
to the third equation in the CDM model. PRVF model productivity as a persistent stochastic
variable whose distribution is shifted by the rms past productivity and current realizations
of product and process innovations. In addition, rms with a large R&D portfolio may realize
multiple innovations or innovations of higher quality. Converting the innovation into future sales
and prots may require investments in capital, worker training, hiring, or additional costs that
noninnovating rms do not incur. These factors suggest that a rms access to nancial resources
plays a crucial role for the size of productivity gains resulting from innovation outcomes. We
model the evolution of the rms productivity with the cdf G(!it+1j!it; dit+1; zit+1; fit).4 More
specically:
!it+1 = g(!it; dit+1; zit+1;fit) + "it+1 (3)




it + 4dit+1fit + 5zit+1fit + 6dit+1zit+1fit + "it+1
The function g() is the conditional expectation of future productivity and " is an iid stochastic
shock that is drawn from a N(0; 2") distribution. We parameterize the productivity evolution
process as a cubic function of lagged productivity and interaction terms between product in-
novations, process innovations, and the rms nancial strength. Specically, we classify each
rm into one of three nancial strength categories based on its credit rating. In this speci-
cation, the variable zit+1fit represents the set of interactions between the innovation outcome
zit+1 and the three dummy variables dening the rms nancial strength, so 4 is a vector
of three coe¢ cients. A similar denition is used for dit+1fit and dit+1zit+1fit: In addition to
allowing the rms nancial strength to impact the evolution of the rms productivity, the
coe¢ cients 1; 2; and 3 capture the intertemporal persistence that is an important feature
of rm-level data on productivity. Because productivity is persistent, the productivity shocks
" in any period are incorporated into future productivity levels rather than having a purely
transitory e¤ect.
4Olley and Pakes (1996) specied productivity evolution as an exogenous stochastic process G(!it+1j!it): Aw,
Roberts and Xu (2011) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) endogenize the productivity evolution process
by letting it depend on the rms choice of R&D, G(!it+1j!it; rdit) and PRVF reformulated it in terms of the
rms innovation outcomes G(!it+1j!it; dit+1; zit+1):
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2.3 The Firms Dynamic Decision to Invest in R&D
The rms decision to invest in R&D results from a comparison of the expected benets of
investing, which depend on expected future improvements in productivity and prots, and
the cost or investment expenditure needed to generate these improvements. We expect rms
to be heterogenous in their innovation costs because of di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of their
R&D labs, the experience or education of their workers, economies of scale in the innovation
process, and the nature of the specic innovation projects they are undertaking. We capture this
heterogeneity by modeling R&D costs as depending on factors that lead to systematic di¤erences
in R&D expenditure and a stochastic component. The rst source of systematic di¤erence in
the rms R&D expenditure occurs because a rm that performs R&D continuously over time
is likely to require a smaller expenditure to generate an innovation than a rm that begins to
invest in R&D because it can rely on past expertise or synergy e¤ects from previous projects.
The second source is the size of the rms R&D portfolio. If investment is protable, rms
with better access to nancial resources can nance more projects at any time or nance higher
quality projects, and we would expect to see higher R&D investments for these rms. We
assume that a rms R&D cost is a random draw from an exponential distribution,
Cit~ exp(
m(rdit 1  fit) + s((1  rdit 1)  fit)) (4)
with mean m(rdit 1  fit) if rm i with nancial strength fit engaged in R&D in the previous
year and s((1  rdit 1)  fit) otherwise. The mean of the cost distribution depends on the full
set of interaction terms between the rms discrete R&D choice in the previous year rdit 1 and
the dummy variables measuring their nancial strength fit: The coe¢ cient vector  = (m; s)
captures di¤erences in costs of maintaining ongoing R&D operations and start-up costs of
beginning to invest in R&D for rms in each of the three nancial categories.
We assume that, at the start of period t; the rm observes its current productivity level !it,
knows its short-run prot function, the process for innovation F; and the process for productivity
evolution G: The rms state variables sit = (!it; rdit 1) evolve endogenously as the rm makes
its decision to conduct R&D, rdit 2 f0; 1g:5 Given its state vector and discount factor , the
5Each rm is characterized by three exogenous variables, its capital stock kit; which enters the prot function,
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rms value function V (sit), before it observes the maintenance or startup cost, can be written
as:




(EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 1)  Cit;EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 0)) dC;
where the expected future value of the rm is dened as an expectation over the future levels
of productivity and innovation outcomes:





V (sit+1)dG(!it+1j!it; dit+1; zit+1)dF (dit+1; zit+1jrdit): (6)
Equation (5) shows that the rm chooses to invest in R&D if the discounted expected future
prots from investing, EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 1); net of the relevant maintenance or startup
cost, are greater than the expected future prots from not investing, EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 0):
What di¤erentiates these two expected future prots is the e¤ect of R&D on the rms future
productivity. Using this specication, we can dene the marginal benet of conducting R&D
as:
EV (!it)  EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 1)  EtV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 0): (7)
The rm chooses to invest in R&D if EV (!it)  Cit(rdit 1): This condition is used in the
empirical model to explain the rms observed R&D choice.
Overall, in contrast to CDM, this model endogenizes the rms choice to undertake R&D in-
vestments by explicitly characterizing the net expected future prots from the two alternatives.
Following the approach developed in PRVF, we estimate the innovation function, productivity
evolution process, and distributions of startup and maintenance costs faced by the rm, and
quantify EV (!it), the expected long-run payo¤ to investing in R&D.
its nancial strength fit which enters the cost function for innovation and the innovation and productivity
evolution processes, and its industry which enters all of the structural components. To simplify the notation,
we suppress these exogenous characteristics and explain the dynamic decision to invest in R&D focusing on the
endogenous variables in the model ! and rd. In the empirical model we treat the rms capital stock, nancial
strength, and industry as dening an exogenous rm type and solve the rms value function for each rm type.
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3 Data
The data we use is drawn from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) survey of German
rms collected by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). The data covers the
period 1993-2008 and follows the form of the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) that are
administered in many OECD countries (see Peters and Rammer (2013) for details on the MIP
survey). We estimate the model for a group of high-tech manufacturing industries including
(NACE Rev 1.1 codes): chemicals (23, 24), non-electrical machinery (29), electrical machinery
(30, 31, 32), instruments (33), and motor vehicles (34, 35).
The estimation requires data on rm revenue, variable costs, capital stock, innovation ex-
penditures, product and process innovations, and nancial strength. Firm revenue is total sales,
total variable cost is the sum of expenditure on labor, materials, and energy, and the rms
short-run prot is the di¤erence between revenue and total variable cost. The rms value is
the discounted sum of the future short-run prots. We restrict the sample to the rms that
report all the necessary variables and have at least two consecutive years of data. This gives a
total of 1200 rms and 3067 observations.
The nancial strength variables are constructed from the rms credit rating produced by
the company Creditreform.6 The rating is based on the likelihood that the borrower will be
able to service their debts fully and on time. It takes into account the credit opinion of experts,
the rms business development strategy, past history of bill payments, growth, sales, capital,
age, order history, industry, and legal form of organizaton among other things. We assign each
rm to one of three categories based on their credit rating. The Creditreform rating is a score
between 100 and 600 with 100 being the best rating. We assign rms to the high nancial
strength category if their rating is 100 to 190. Firms with credit ratings between 191-228 are
classied in the medium category and rms with ratings higher than 229 are assigned to the
low category.7
6Creditreform is the largest German credit rating agency. This information has been used as a measure of
nancial constraints in previous studies by Czarnitzki (2006) and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2009). A measure
of credit constraints based on the repayment of trade credits has been used in Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette
and Eymard (2012).
7 In terms of Standard and Poors rating system, the high category corresponds to ratings above BBB, the
medium category to ratings above BB to BBB, and the low category to ratings BB and below.
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In our sample, there is substantial persistence over time in a rms nancial strength.
Between adjoining years, 95.5 percent of the rms that start in the high-strength category,
91.4 that start in the middle category, and 87.3 percent that start in the low category, remain
in the same category in the next year. In addition, 25.1 percent of the rms remain in the
high-strength category over the whole period we observe them, 31.6 percent in the medium
category and 20.6 percent in the low category. The remaining 22.7 percent of the rms switch
at least once. In the dynamic model we will not attempt to model the transition process for this
variable, but rather assume that the rm treats its nancial strength category as xed when
making the R&D decision.
A feature of the Community Innovation Surveys is that they provide measures of both
innovation input and innovation output. Innovation input is measured by the rms expenditure
on a set of activities related to innovation, including R&D spending but also spending on worker
training, acquisition of external knowledge and capital, marketing, and design expenditures for
producing a new product or introducing a new production process. Innovation output captures
the introduction of a new product or a new production process by the rm. The Oslo Manual
(OECD (1992, 1997, 2005)) denes a product innovation as a new or signicantly improved
product or service. A process innovation refers to new or signicant changes in the way products
are produced, delivered, or supplied. The main purpose of a process innovation is to reduce
production or delivery costs. For instance, the introduction of automation or IT-networking
technology in production or logistics are process innovations. The innovation does not have to
be new to the market but only to the rm. A rm could report an innovation if it adopted a
production technology from a competitor or expanded its product line even if the product was
already o¤ered by other rms.
Table 1 summarizes the proportion of rms in the sample that report positive innovation ex-
penditures, successful product innovations, and successful process innovations for each industry
and for the three discrete categories of nancial strength. The rst pattern to observe is that
the rate of investment in innovation activities is always highest for the rms in the high nancial
strength category and declines as we move to the medium and low nancial strength categories.
For example, in the chemical industry the proportion of rms in the high strength category
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that invest is 0.805 and this declines to 0.737 and 0.695 with declines in nancial strength.
This monotonic reduction is present in every industry except the vehicle industry, where the
medium category has the lowest investment rate. Averaging across the ve industries, the
investment rate is 0.873 for the high strength category, 0.759 for the medium, and 0.707 for the
low category. This decline in the proportion of rms that invest can reect either a decline in
the expected benets of innovation-related investments, an increase in the cost of innovation,
or both. The structural model developed above is designed to distinguish these explanations.
A second pattern that is observed in Table 1 is that the rate of both new product and new
process innovations declines as the nancial position of the rm becomes weaker. Again, the
decline is monotonic across nancial strength categories except for the vehicle industry. This
decline could reect higher levels of R&D spending by the nancially stronger rms, so that
they generate higher rates of innovation. A third pattern is that the investment rates in the top
part of the table are always greater than the innovation rates for the corresponding category.
This reects the fact that some rms invest in R&D but do not realize any innovations. Finally,
the product innovation rate is greater than the process innovation rate. This can reect the
fact that in this group of high-tech industries competition among rms is more strongly related
to improving product quality through product innovation rather than reducing cost through
process innovations.8
8PRVF compare innovation rates for these high-tech industries and a group of seven low-tech manufacturing
industries that have much lower rates of R&D investment. They nd that, while product innovations are still
generally more common, product and process innovation rates are much more similar in the low-tech industries.
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:Table 1: Rate of R&D Investment and Innovation
Financial Strength fit
R&D Investment Rate rdit High Medium Low
Chemicals 0.805 0.737 0.695
Machinery 0.900 0.743 0.616
Electronics 0.852 0.845 0.793
Instruments 0.948 0.835 0.792
Vehicles 0.864 0.531 0.722
Average across industries 0.873 0.759 0.707
Product Innovation Rate dit+1
Chemicals 0.715 0.674 0.621
Machinery 0.834 0.683 0.550
Electronics 0.831 0.763 0.732
Instruments 0.903 0.795 0.682
Vehicles 0.727 0.508 0.611
Average across industries 0.805 0.703 0.627
Process Innovation Rate zit+1
Chemicals 0.581 0.536 0.505
Machinery 0.665 0.529 0.358
Electronics 0.634 0.586 0.463
Instruments 0.652 0.514 0.455
Vehicles 0.659 0.469 0.472
Average across industries 0.636 0.531 0.429
4 Empirical Model
In this section we briey outline the key components and steps of the empirical model. De-
tails of the estimation procedure are provided in PRVF. Estimation is divided into two steps.
In the rst step, the prot function, equations (1) and (2), and the process of productivity
evolution, equation (3), are jointly estimated using the methodology developed by Doraszelski
and Jaumandreu (2013). Material expenditure is used as the control variable for the unob-
served productivity level. Following estimation we construct an estimate of productivity for
each observation. The data used at this stage are the rms sales, capital stock, discrete in-
novation variables, variable input expenditures, and nancial strength variables. We estimate
the elasticity of demand by regressing the rms total variable cost on rm sales (Aw, Roberts
and Xu 2011). At this stage we also estimate the innovation process F (dit+1;zit+1j rdit; fit)
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nonparametrically using data on discrete innovation outcomes, discrete R&D, and the discrete
nancial strength variables.
In the second step, the parameters of the cost function for R&D are estimated using the
rms discrete choice of R&D. The probability that a rm chooses to invest in R&D is given by
the probability that its innovation cost Cit(rdit 1) is less than or equal to the expected payo¤:
Pr (rdit = 1jsit) = Pr [Cit(rdit 1)  EV (!it)] : (8)
Using parameter estimates from the rst-stage we solve the value function, equation (5), on
a grid of values for the state variables !it and rdit 1: The value function is solved and the
payo¤ to R&D is constructed for each rm type which is dened on a grid of values for the
capital stock, industry, and nancial strength category. Subsequently, we interpolate the payo¤
to R&D, EV (!it); for each data point using a cubic spline. The estimates of EV (!it) are
used to predict the probability of conducting R&D and to construct the likelihood function for
the discrete R&D choices in the data.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimates of the Innovation and Productivity Processes
In this section we report the ndings for the rst step of the estimation. Table 2 reports
estimates of the innovation probabilities conditional on prior year R&D and nancial strength
F (dit+1; zit+1jrdit; fit): There are four possible outcomes for the discrete innovation variables.
To simplify the results, we report the average across the ve industries (the estimation recognizes
the di¤erences across the industries). The top half of the table reports innovation probabilities
for rms that have not incurred innovation expenditures in the previous year and the bottom
half reports the probabilities for rms with positive innovation expenditure.
Among the rms that did not invest in R&D, the probability of not getting either a new
product or process innovation is large and rises from 0.713 to 0.801 as the nancial strength
of the rm declines. Conversely, the probability of having both types of innovations declines
from 0.164 to 0.104. For rms in the high and medium nancial group, product innovations
occur more frequently while process innovations are more likely for rms in the low nancial
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group. Among the rms that invested in R&D in the previous year, the probability of realizing
neither type of innovation is signicantly lower, varying from 0.083 to 0.144 across groups, while
the probability of both innovation types is substantially higher, ranging from 0.668 to 0.512.
Overall, the estimates in table 2 indicate a positive correlation between the rms nancial
strength and the probability of innovation. Firms with higher nancial strength may have
larger portfolios of R&D projects and thus be more likely to generate at least one innovation if
they invest. Alternatively, if these rms do not invest they may still be better able to exploit
opportunities that arise through learning-by-doing or other pathways that do not involve explicit
R&D investment.
Table 2: Probability of Innovation Conditional on Past R&D: Pr(dit+1; zit+1j rdit; fit)
(averaged across ve industries)
Innovation Outcome None Product Process Both
d = z = 0 d = 1; z = 0 d = 0; z = 1 d = 1 , z = 1
Financial Strength rdt = 0
High 0.713 0.066 0.057 0.164
Medium 0.770 0.061 0.026 0.142
Low 0.801 0.054 0.041 0.104
rdt = 1
High 0.083 0.220 0.029 0.668
Medium 0.094 0.260 0.045 0.601
Low 0.144 0.309 0.034 0.512
The expected benets of R&D investment depend on the revenue/prot function and how
the innovations impact their development, equations (1) and (3).9 Table 3 reports two sets of
parameter estimates for two di¤erent specications of productivity evolution. In the rst case,
productivity evolution does not depend on the rms nancial strength and the estimates of
parameters 4; 5; and 6 measure the average impact of product and process innovations on
productivity improvement across all rms. The second case interacts dummy variables for the
three nancial strength categories with the innovation outcomes and allows the three innovation
coe¢ cients to vary across the nancial categories.
The rst row of Table 3 reports the capital coe¢ cient which implies that increases in capital
9The benets also depend on the industry demand elasticity. The elasticity estimates we construct are:
chemicals -3.075, machinery -5.078, electronics -3.713, instruments -4.213, and vehicles -4.891.
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reduce the rms short-run marginal cost. The next three coe¢ cients summarize the persistence
of rm productivity over time and they indicate that productivity is highly persistent. These
coe¢ cient estimates are hardly a¤ected when the nancial strength categorical variables are
added to the productivity process.
The coe¢ cients on the innovation variables exhibit a very interesting pattern. When the
nancial controls are not included the coe¢ cients indicate that a new product innovation raises
productivity, on average, by 3.9 percent, while a process innovation raises it by 3.7 percent.
The coe¢ cients are statistically signicant at the .01 and .05 level, respectively. Firms that
report both types of innovations have an average productivity increase of 6.8 percent, which is
basically the sum of the two individual e¤ects, since the interaction coe¢ cient 6 is small and
not statistically signicant. When the productivity impact of innovation is disaggregated by
nancial strength, we observe a larger e¤ect of innovation for nancially strong rms. For these
rms, a product innovation raises average productivity by 8.6 percent, a process innovation
raises it by 9.0 percent. Firms with both innovations have, on average, a productivity gain of
11.5 percent. All three coe¢ cients are statistically signicant. In contrast, rms in the medium
nancial strength category have more modest productivity gains from innovation. They average
3.9 percent for product innovations, 3.2 percent for process innovations, and 5.8 percent for rms
with both innovations, but only the product innovation e¤ect is statistically signicant. For
the rms in the lowest nancial strength category, the productivity e¤ects are small: 0.8, 0.6,
and 3.8 percent for product, process, and both innovations, respectively. None of the three
coe¢ cients, however, are statistically signicant.
Overall, the productivity and thus, prot, impact of an innovation varies substantially across
these groups of rms and a¤ect their expected benets from investing in R&D accordingly.
In particular, the small productivity impact of the innovations for rms with low nancial
strength, gives them little incentive to invest in R&D. Products and processes developed with
limited resources and fewer inputs might be of lower quality or limited scope and hence yield
low productivity gains for the investing rms. Furthermore, it takes nancial resources to
implement innovations. The path from developing a new product to actual sales and prots
requires investments in legal, marketing, design, and testing processes that require nancial
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resources. Firms in a strong nancial position may also have invested in a larger number of
research projects and thus have a larger number of innovations that they could potentially
exploit. As a result, a strong nancial position can help rms to earn higher returns on their
innovations.
Table 3: The Process of Productivity Evolution (standard errors)
Variable Parameter No Financial Controls With Financial Controls
lnk k -0.060 (0.003)** -0.061 (0.003)**
lagged ! 1 0.741 (0.020)** 0.721 (0.019)**
lagged !2 2 0.190 (0.013)** 0.183 (0.012)**
lagged !3 3 -0.053 (0.004)** -0.050 (0.004)**
d 4 0.039 (0.008)**
z 5 0.037 (0.015)*
d  z 6 -0.008 (0.016)
d  fhigh 4 0.086 (0.012)**
z  fhigh 5 0.090 (0.027)**
d  z  fhigh 6 -0.061 (0.030)*
d  fmedium 4 0.039 (0.010)**
z  fmedium 5 0.032 (0.020)
d  z  fmedium 6 -0.013 (0.023)
d  flow 4 0.008 (0.011)
z  flow 5 0.006 (0.025)
d  z  flow 6 0.024 (0.028)
intercept 0 1.064 (0.184)** 1.104 (0.183)**
chemicals 0.041 (0.037) 0.024 (.037)
machinery 0.024 (0.031) -0.007 (.031)
electronics 0.050 (0.035) 0.039 (.034)
instruments 0.073 (0.034)* 0.046 (.034)
observations 3067 3067
R2 0.937 0.939
Both models contain time dummies as described in PRVF.
** signicant at the .01 level, * signicant at the .05 level.
5.2 Estimates of the Cost of Innovation
The cost function we estimate in the second stage can be interpreted as the cost of purchasing
the expected benet EV (!it). The economic value of undertaking R&D depends on how it
is translated into innovations, productivity, and prots. The cost parameters estimated from
rmsdiscrete R&D decisions rationalize the expected benets of R&D and the observed R&D
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investment rate. In particular, given two groups of rms with the same investment rate, the
group with lower expected benet from R&D must also have lower costs. With respect to
rmsnancial strength, the expected benets of investment are smaller for rms in the lower
nancial strength categories, hence we will observe lower estimated costs for this group of rms.
Alternatively, if two groups of rms have the same expected benet, then the group with the
higher investment rate must have lower costs.
The parameters characterizing the mean of the innovation cost function are reported in Table
4. We allow the estimated cost parameters to di¤er across industries and nancial categories.
The second column reports the cost parameters for rms starting new R&D investment and
the third column the costs for rms maintaining their R&D program. In each case the startup
cost is greater than the maintenance cost for the same industry or nancial category, reecting
the fact that the observed investment rate is lower for rms that do not have previous R&D
experience. With respect to the nancial strength categories, the cost parameters decline as we
move from the high to low strength category. The higher costs for the high strength category
reects the higher expected benets of R&D for rms in this category. Finally, there are also
industry di¤erences in the cost levels that reect industry variation in the expected benets
and investment rates. The magnitudes, however, are small compared to the di¤erences across
nancial categories.
Table 4: Innovation Cost Parameters* (bootstrap standard errors)
Startup Cost Maintenance Cost
High Financial Strength 22.610 (6.060) 4.780 (0.602)
Medium Financial Strength 3.215 (1.162) 0.369 (0.103)
Low Financial Strength 0.166 (0.342) 0.034 (0.074)
Chemical 6.989 (4.024) 0.143 (0.077)
Machinery 2.760 (0.934) 0.420 (0.097)
Electronics 1.283 (0.875) 0.137 (0.076)
Instruments 0.580 (0.970) 0.092 (0.075)
Vehicles 1.678 (2.814) 1.096 (0.581)
log likelihood -1636.92
* millions of euros
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5.3 Expected Benets, Costs, and Probability of Investment
We use the parameter estimates from the structural model to construct three summary measures
of the R&D investment process for each rm: rst, the expected benet of R&D investment,
equation (7), which is a function of the rms productivity, capital stock, nancial strength,
and industry; second, the mean R&D expenditure, given the rm chooses to invest in R&D,
E(CitjCit(rdit 1)  EV (!it)); third, the probability the rm invests in R&D, equation (8).
The second and third measures depend on the rms prior R&D experience and the factors
determining EV: Table 5, column 2, reports the mean of each measure over all observations;
similarly, columns 3, 4, and 5 report the mean of these measures over the observations in each
nancial category.
Table 5: R&D Benets, Costs, and Investment Rates (mean over all observations)
All Firms Financial Strength
High Medium Low
EV  12.783 31.949 5.463 1.347
E(CtjCt  EV; rdt 1 = 1) 1.557 4.053 0.523 0.204
E(CtjCt  EV; rdt 1 = 0) 4.213 10.587 1.745 0.467
Pr(rdt = 1jrdt 1 = 1) 0.829 0.861 0.855 0.746
Pr(rdt = 1jrdt 1 = 0) 0.445 0.559 0.432 0.330
* millions of euros
In the top row we report the expected benet of investing in R&D. It averages 12.783
million euros over the total sample. This number is the average addition to rm value resulting
from R&D investment. Disaggregating this measure across the nancial strength categories
we see the average benet falls from 31.949 million euros to 5.463 and 1.347 million euros as
nancial strength declines. This decline reects the combined e¤ects of fewer innovations, as
seen in Table 2, and a smaller productivity impact of innovations for rms with weak nancial
position, as seen in Table 3. While not reported in the table, this fall in the expected benets
of investing in R&D is present in all ve industries.
The second and third rows of Table 5 report the mean predicted R&D expenditure among
those rms that nd it protable to invest in R&D. The expenditures di¤er between investing
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rms paying a maintenance cost (rdt 1 = 1) and those paying a startup cost (rdt 1 = 0) for
their investment. Firms that continue their R&D investments spend, on average, 1.557 million
euros, while those that are starting R&D spend more, 4.213 million euros, on average. The
predicted expenditure also depends on the rms nancial strength, reecting the variation
in the expected benets of R&D across these categories. We predict for nancially strong
rms, average expenditures of 4.503 and 10.587 million euros in the maintenance and startup
cost categories, respectively. As the expected benets of R&D decline with nancial strength,
the average expenditure does so as well. Firms in the lowest nancial category have average
predicted expenditures of 0.204 and 0.467 million euros.
The last two rows of Table 5 report the predicted probability of a rm investing in R&D,
which depends on both the expected benets and cost distribution of the investment. Averaging
over all rms, the probability of investing is 0.829 for rms with previous investment. This
probability declines from 0.861 for rms in the highest category to 0.855 and 0.746 for rms in
the medium and low nancial categories, respectively.10 For those rms that are paying R&D
startup costs, the probability of investing is much lower, 0.445 on average, and declines for all
industries as nancial strength declines. On average, this probability is 0.559, 0.432, and 0.330
for rms in the three nancial groups. Overall, Table 5 demonstrates that our measure of rm
nancial strength captures a dimension of rm heterogeneity that is related to the benets and
the average expenditure on R&D across rms.
5.4 Long and Short-Run Returns to R&D
An advantage of the PRVF framework is that it provides measures of both the long-run and
short-run benets of R&D investment. The short-run gain captures changes in sales and prots
in the subsequent period, while the long-run gain captures the changes in rm value due to the
rm being on a higher productivity path. The latter includes both a higher prot stream and
di¤erent optimal future R&D choices. Both of these e¤ects are induced by the productivity
gain resulting from R&D investment.
10The decline in investment probability, however, is not observed in all industries. Firms in the medium and
low nancial categories of the chemicals, electronics, and instruments industries, have a higher average investment
probability than rms in the high nancial category.
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The long-run gain is dened as the proportional impact of R&D on rm value. It is measured
as the log di¤erence in the expected future value of the rm, equation (6), conditional on its
R&D choice while holding xed the rms other characteristics:
 lnEV = ln(EV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 1))  ln(EV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 0)):
The values are reported in the top panel of Table 6, disaggregated by industry and nancial
category. The second column of Table 6 reports the mean value of EV (sit+1j!it; rdit = 0);
denoted
____
EV ; which is the base to use for interpreting the proportional change in rm value.
Focusing on all rms in the sample, the mean of  lnEV equals 0.066 with a standard de-
viation of 0.047. This means, across the whole sample, R&D investment increases the expected
future value of the rm by 6.6 percent, on average. When compared against the base of 127.44
million euros for the expected future value of the rm in the absence of R&D investment, this
equates to 8.38 million euros. The last three columns of the table show that this gain also varies
across the nancial strength categories, declining substantially as we move from the high to the
low category. In the high category, the average return (standard deviation) is 0.116 (0.041)
and this average return falls to 0.055 (0.025) and 0.023 (0.014) in the medium and low strength
categories, respectively. The decline in average return reects all factors underlying the di¤er-
ences between rms in the three nancial categories. These factors include the probability of
receiving an innovation, the impact of innovation on productivity, and the di¤erences in rms
productivity and capital stocks. The reduction in the standard deviation of the long-run re-
turn in nancial strength states that rms in the low strength group are more similar in their
underlying productivity and size than rms in the other two nancial groups.
The remaining rows in the top panel of Table 6 provide the average long-run returns
disaggregated by industry. The decline in the mean and standard deviation of the long-run
return in nancial strength is present in every industry. Since the base
___
EV varies across
industries, the euro magnitude of the gains from R&D varies across industries as well. It is
highest in the vehicle, chemical, and machinery industries.
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Table 6: Proportional Return to R&D in the Long Run and Short Run
(mean and standard deviation over all observations)
Financial Strength




All Industries 127.44 0.066 (0.047) 0.116 (0.041) 0.055 (0.025) 0.023 (0.014)
Chemicals 134.12 0.080 (0.045) 0.111 (0.040) 0.065 (0.034) 0.032 (0.016)
Machinery 140.69 0.066 (0.041) 0.112 (0.030) 0.057 (0.020) 0.026 (0.015)
Electronics 114.67 0.055 (0.044) 0.108 (0.048) 0.045 (0.021) 0.023 (0.012)
Instruments 66.31 0.060 (0.046) 0.115 (0.046) 0.053 (0.021) 0.016 (0.009)




All Industries 29.48 0.134 0.234 0.113 0.057
Chemicals 51.82 0.097 0.129 0.081 0.043
Machinery 19.11 0.164 0.291 0.132 0.068
Electronics 38.41 0.093 0.163 0.082 0.049
Instruments 8.90 0.136 0.242 0.118 0.058
Vehicles 46.80 0.167 0.334 0.148 0.054
The empirical model also provides a measure of the short-run payo¤to R&D, which we dene
as the percentage gain in rm revenue resulting from R&D investment. This is a discrete analog
to the elasticity of output (usually measured as revenue) with respect to R&D expenditure that
is frequently estimated in the CDM literature. In our framework, since prots are proportional
to revenue, equation (2), this percentage increase in revenue is equal to the percentage increase
in prot. Using the estimation results on the e¤ect of R&D on the innovation probability (Table
2) and innovation impact on productivity (Table 3), we construct this measure as:
r = (1 + )
P
(d;z)
[g(!; d; z; f)  g(!; 0; 0; f)] [Pr(d; zjrd = 1; f)  Pr(d; zjrd = 0; f)]
for all (d; z) 2 f(1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g : The bottom panel of Table 6 reports the mean estimate of
this revenue gain for each industry and nancial category.11 The second column reports the
average level of short-run prots in each industry, denoted by
_
 .
Firms that invest in R&D have a revenue increase of between 9.3 (electronics) and 16.7 (ve-
hicles) percent. These estimates are at the upper end of the range of output elasticity estimates
11There are no standard deviations in these cells because the estimate does not vary within a cell because it
does not depend on rm productivity or capital stock. In the model it only varies across rms with di¤erences
in industry and nancial strength category.
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with respect to R&D expenditure that are summarized in Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010).12
Their reported measures generally come from studies measuring the percentage change in rev-
enue for an additonal monetary unit of R&D spending, while our proportional gain in revenue
comes from a zero-one R&D choice. If the marginal revenue gain declines with additional
spending, then our measure, the discrete impact of R&D investment, is likely to be larger.
The last three columns of Table 6 report the short-run revenue gain across rms with
di¤erent degrees of nancial strength. The estimates vary substantially in this dimension. For
rms in the highest category, the revenue di¤erence averages 23.4 percent and varies from 12.9
to 33.4 percent across industries. These numbers translate into absolute gains of 6.89, 6.68, and
15.63 million euros, respectively. In each industry, the proportional gain in revenue declines as
we move to the medium and low categories. For rms in the low strength category, the gain
from R&D averages 5.7 percent and varies in a narrower band between 4.3 to 6.8 percent across
the industries.
6 Conclusion
In a recent paper, Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2013) develop a dynamic, structural
model of R&D choice. The rms decision to invest in R&D is modeled as the solution to a
dynamic optimization problem in which the rm weighs the costs of investment against the
expected long-run benet from conducting R&D. In their model, the benets of the investment
depend on the R&D-innovation-productivity linkage that was introduced by Crépon, Duguet,
and Mairesse (1998). In this article, we use the PRVF framework to study the role of a rms
nancial strength on its decision to invest in R&D. Using data for a sample of German manu-
facturing rms in ve high technology industries, we construct a measure of nancial strength
based on the rms credit rating and allow this to a¤ect the R&D-innovation-productivity
process at several points. The rms nancial strength can a¤ect its R&D investment decision
by a¤ecting their ability to commercialize and exploit innovations they generate.
12 In their review of the literature, Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010) report that production function-based
estimates of this elasticity vary from 0.01 to 0.25 and are centered around 0.08. Doraszelski and Jaumendreu
(2013, Table 5) report summary statistics of the distribution of rm-level estimates for ten Spanish manufacturing
industries. The average over all rms is 0.015, and the average at the industry level varies from -0.006 to 0.046
across the ten industries, with half of the industries falling between 0.013 and 0.022.
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Our empirical ndings indicate that the expected long-run payo¤ from investing in R&D
increases with the rms nancial strength. This occurs because rms in a strong nancial
position have a higher probability of realizing product and process innovations. In addition to
being able to devote more resources to innovation, rms in a strong nancial position may also
be able to develop a portfolio of complementary projects that enhances their innovation success.
The empirical results further show that the impact of innovations on productivity and prots is
larger for rms in a strong nancial position. This higher economic return could reect higher
quality innovations, an ability to better develop and market the innovations, and the return on
a larger number of R&D projects that they are able to sustain. Finally, the results show that
these rms have higher expenditures on R&D investment but, overall, the higher expected net
payo¤ gives rms with greater nancial strength a larger incentive to invest in R&D.
The PRVF model provides a useful measure of the expected long-run benet of R&D,
dened as the increment to long-run rm value resulting from the R&D investment. In the ve
German industries we study in this article, this average benet varies from 5.5 percent in the
electronics industry to 8.0 percent in chemicals. Comparing across nancial strength categories,
the average increase in rm value is 11.6 percent for rms in the highest category, 5.5 in the
medium, and 2.3 in the lowest category.
While this article documents that the underlying factors that contribute to the rms R&D
investment choice are positively correlated with the nancial strength of the rm as indicated
by its credit rating, the distinct roles of internal cash ow, retained past earnings, and external
funding as sources of investment funds cannot be identied with the data we use. In addition,
the rms credit rating may be a proxy for more than just the nancial resources available
to the rm. It reects other factors including the overall quality of the rms product line,
its longevity, or quality of its management that are not directly related to its ability to fund
R&D investment. The results indicate that there is an important source of rm heterogeneity
explaining di¤erences in rm R&D choice beyond its capital stock, productivity, industry, and
R&D history. For this reason, we prefer to view our ndings on the role of nancial strength
as likely reecting a broader pattern of variation due to di¤erences in rm quality, rather than
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